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Most Americans who listened to radio or surfed the internet on election day this year sat down 
to watch the evening television coverage thinking John Kerry won the election. Exit polls showed 
him ahead in nearly every battleground state, in many cases by sizable margins. Although pre-
election day polls indicated the race dead even or Bush slightly ahead, two factors seemed to 
explain Kerry’s edge: turnout was very high, good news for Democrats,3 and, as in every US 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Jonathan Baron, Bernard B. Beard, Michael Bein, Mark Blumenthal, James Brown, Elaine 
Calabrese, Becky Collins, Gregory Eck, Jeremy Firestone, Lilian Friedberg, Robert Giambatista, Kurt Gloos, Gwen 
Hughes, Clyde Hull, Carolyn Julye, John Kessel, Mark Kind, Joe Libertelli, Warren Mitofsky, Michael Morrissey, 
John Morrison, Barry Negrin, Elinor Pape, David Parks, Kaja Rebane, Sandra Rothenberg, Cynthia Royce, Joseph 
Shipman, Jonathon Simon, Daniela Starr, Larry Starr, Barry Stennett, Roy Streit, Leanne Tobias, Andrei Villarroel, 
Lars Vinx, Ken Warren, Andreas Wuest, Elaine Zanutto, John Zogby, and Dan Zoutis for helpful comments or other 
help in preparing this report. I would also like to thank the many others who wrote to me expressing support, and 
apologize for not having had time to answer. I also apologize to those who may have sent helpful suggestions that I 
did not have time to read. I was overwhelmed with the response to the initial drafts of the paper. 
2  This report was originally published on November 12, 2004 as Center for Organizational Dynamics Working Paper 
#04-10 (University of Pennsylvania, School or Arts & Sciences, Graduate Division). It was revised on November 21, 
2004; the most important change was to use more conservative assumptions on the statistical accuracy of the exit 
polls. I made only minor clarifications since. 
3  Nonvoters are generally more Democratic than voters. Democratic Party candidates generally benefit from higher 
turnout because the increase comes disproportionately from voters in socio-economic groups that traditionally vote 
Democratic. (Jack Citrin, Eric Schickler & John Sides (2003) “What If everyone voted? Simulating the impact of 
increased turnout in senate elections,” American Journal of Political Science, 47(1):75-90) 
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presidential election with an incumbent over the past quarter-century, undecided voters broke 
heavily toward the challenger.4 
 
But then, in key state after key state, counts showed very different numbers than the polls 
predicted; and the differentials were all in the same direction. The first shaded column in Table 
1.1 shows the differential between the major candidates’ predicted (exit poll) percentages of the 
vote; the next shaded column shows the differential between their tallied percentages of the vote. 
The final shaded column reveals the “shift.” In ten of the eleven consensus battleground states,5 
the tallied margin differs from the predicted margin, and in every one, the shift favors Bush.  
 
Table 1.16: Predicted vs. tallied percentages in battleground states 
 
  Bush 
predicted 
Kerry 
predicted
Predicted 
differential
Bush 
tallied 
Kerry 
tallied 
Tallied 
differential 
Tallied vs. 
predicted 
 Colorado 49.9% 48.1% Bush 1.8 52.0% 46.8% Bush 5.2 Bush 3.4 
 Florida 49.8% 49.7% Bush 0.1 52.1% 47.1% Bush 5.0 Bush 4.9 
 Iowa 48.4% 49.7% Kerry 1.3 50.1% 49.2% Bush 0.9 Bush 2.2 
 Michigan  46.5% 51.5% Kerry 5.0 47.8% 51.2% Kerry 3.4 Bush 1.6 
 Minnesota 44.5% 53.5% Kerry 9.0 47.6% 51.1% Kerry 3.5 Bush 5.5 
 Nevada 47.9% 49.2% Kerry 1.3 50.5% 47.9% Bush 2.6 Bush 3.9 
 New Hampshire 44.1% 54.9% Kerry 10.8 49.0% 50.3% Kerry 1.3 Bush 9.5 
 New Mexico 47.5% 50.1% Kerry 2.6 50.0% 48.9% Bush 1.1 Bush 3.7 
 Ohio 47.9% 52.1% Kerry 4.2 51.0% 48.5% Bush 2.5 Bush 6.7 
 Pennsylvania 45.4% 54.1% Kerry 8.7 48.6% 50.8% Kerry 2.2 Bush 6.5 
 Wisconsin 48.8% 49.2% Kerry 0.4 49.4% 49.8% Kerry 0.4 No dif 
 
The media have largely ignored this discrepancy (although the blogosphere has been abuzz), 
suggesting either that the polls were flawed, or that the differential was within normal sampling 
error, a statistical anomaly, or could otherwise be easily explained away. In this report, I examine 
the validity of exit poll data, sampling error, the likelihood of statistical anomaly, and other 
explanations thus far offered to explain this discrepancy. 
 
 
                                                 
4  There have been four incumbent presidential elections in the past quarter-century. On average, the incumbent 
comes in half a point below his final poll result; challengers exceed their final poll result by an average of 4 points. 
(Guy Molyneux, "The Big Five-Oh," The American Prospect Online, October 1, 2004)   Exit poll data from the 
CNN website indicate that those who decided in the last three days chose Kerry over Bush 55% - 40%. 
5  These eleven are classified as battleground states based on being on at least two of three prominent lists: Zogby, 
MSNBC, and the Washington Post. Another sometimes-mentioned state, Oregon, did not have a comparable exit 
poll because voting in the state is by mail. (These twelve states did in fact turn out to be the most competitive in the 
election; in no other state was the winning margin within 7%.) 
6  Source: CNN website, November 3, 2004 12:21 a.m.  
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Exit Poll Data 
The data I use for this report are those posted on the CNN website election night. CNN had 
the data by virtue of membership in the National Election Pool (NEP), a consortium of news 
organizations that pooled resources to conduct a large-scale exit poll, as was done in the 2000 and 
2002 elections. NEP, in turn, had contracted two respected firms, Edison Media Research and 
Mitofsky International,7 to conduct the polls. 
 
Calibrated and Uncalibrated Exit Poll Data 
Part of the reason the issue went away for the media – and simultaneously raised suspicion on 
the web – is secrecy and confusion about the data and what exactly is being characterized as the 
exit poll. If you go to the CNN website or any other website on which 2004 exit poll data are 
available, you’ll see numbers very different from those released on election day. This is because 
the survey results originally collected and presented to subscribers were subsequently “corrected” 
to conform to official tallies.  
 
The pollsters explain this as a natural procedure: the “uncalibrated” data were preliminary; 
once the counts come in, they recalibrate their original data on the assumptions that the count is 
correct, and that any discrepancies must have been due to imbalanced representation in their 
samples or some other polling error. The pollsters have taken great pains to argue that their polls 
were not designed to verify election results,8 but rather to provide election coverage support to 
subscribers – as one set of data that the networks could use to project winners and to explain 
voting patterns, i.e., who voted for whom, and why people voted as they did.  
 
Whatever the merits of calibrating exit poll data, it obscures the issue of why the uncalibrated 
polls were so far off and mostly in the same direction. Although this calibration process may 
seem perfectly natural to NEP, it confuses nearly everyone else, even sophisticated analysts 
intimately involved in voting issues. The MIT-Caltech Voting Project, for example, issued a 
                                                 
7  Warren Mitofsky, the founder of Mitofsky International, is credited with having invented the exit poll. (David W. 
Moore, Senior Gallup Poll Editor, “New Exit Poll Consortium Vindication for Exit Poll Inventor,” Gallup News 
Service, October 11, 2003) 
8  Martin Plissner, “In Defense of Exit Polls: You just don't know how to use them,” Slate, November 4, 2004 
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report concluding that exit poll data were consistent with state tallies and that there were no 
discrepancies based on voting method, including electronic voting systems. But they used these 
adjusted data to validate the process. In other words, they used data in which the count is assumed 
correct to prove that the count is correct! Sadly, this report is being used to dismiss allegations 
that anything might be awry.9 
 
It’s an awful mistake, but entirely understandable – few of us realized that these data were 
corrected. Neither the CNN website, nor any other site of which I am aware, gives any indication 
that the data were anything other than what nearly all of us imagine exit poll data to be – data 
based solely on subjects surveyed leaving the polling place. 
 
Data Used in This Report 
For this report, I use data that apparently are based solely on subjects surveyed leaving the 
polling place. These data were reportedly not intended for public release,10 and were available to 
late evening election night viewers only because a computer glitch prevented NEP from making 
updates sometime around 8:30 p.m. that evening.11 They were collected by Jonathon Simon, a 
former political survey research analyst, and are corroborated by saved screen shots (see Figure 
1.1). I happened to have sixteen CNN exit poll pages stored in my computer memory from view-
ing the evening before, and in each case, his figures are identical to mine. The numbers are also 
roughly consistent with those released elsewhere (Appendix B shows Slate numbers at 7:28 EST).  
 
To derive the “predicted values” used in Tables 1.1 and 1.5, I combine the male and female 
vote, weighted for their percentage of the electorate. Ohio exit poll data (Figure 1.1) indicate that 
51% of men and 53% of women voted for Kerry. Since the electorate is 47% male/53% female, 
Kerry’s overall share of the exit poll was calculated as (51% x 47%) + (53% x 53%) or 52.1%.12 
                                                 
9  Tom Zeller, Jr., "Vote Fraud Theories, Spread by Blogs, Are Quickly Buried," New York Times (Front page); John 
Schwartz, “Mostly Good Reviews for Electronic Voting,” New York Times; Keith Olbermann, MSNBC Countdown. 
All three on November 12, 2004 
10  Martin Plissner, “In Defense of Exit Polls: You just don't know how to use them.” Slate, Thursday, Nov. 4, 2004 
11  Richard Morin, “New Woes Surface in Use of Estimates.” Washington Post, November 4, 2004  
12  Displaying these numbers out to one decimal point is not meant to imply that the numbers are precise to that level 
of significance, but rather to provide as much data as accurately as I can. Among the limitations of the CNN exit 
Freeman: Election ‘04 exit poll discrepancy  page 5 
 
Doing the same calculations for other battleground states and comparing these numbers with final 
tallies (New York Times, Nov. 7), I completed the columns in Tables 1.1 and 1.5. 
 
Figure 1.1. CNN web page with apparently “uncorrected” exit poll data  
(12:21 am Wed, Nov. 3, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Are the Data Valid? 
Some commentators on an early draft of this report rejected these data as unweighted, 
meaning that they have not been adjusted to appropriately weight demographic groups pollsters 
                                                                                                                                                              
poll data are the lack of significant digits. I did not want to unnecessarily degrade the data further by rounding 
numbers derived from calculations. 
 Because CNN data is provided without decimals, underlying percentages for the exit poll numbers may be 
rounded by as much as .5%. It’s unlikely that the derived number would be that far off, because the data come 
from two groups, male and female, both of which would have to have been maximally rounded in the same 
direction. Despite this, the extent of the discrepancy is such that even if every number that I use in this report had 
been rounded the full .5% in an unfavorable direction, the basic findings would all still hold.  
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knowingly under- or over-sampled,13 but it makes no sense that NEP would ever distribute 
unweighted data to anyone, let alone publish them on the web election night. NEP’s predecessor, 
Voter News Service, warns in bold letters in its 2000 methodology statement never to use un-
weighted data for any reason (see Appendix A). Pollsters want to get it right. Their customers are 
depending on it. Broadcasters want to be alerted to probable outcomes, so as to plan their cover-
age accordingly (e.g., pre-writing stories so they can be completed shortly after poll-closings, 
assigning top reporters to winners’ headquarters, being prepared for when concession or victory 
speeches might be forthcoming, etc.). In this case, subscribers were taken by surprise. Anchor 
people were discussing who Kerry would choose for his cabinet, conservative radio hosts were 
warning how now we’re going to see the true John and Teresa Heinz Kerry. Prominent pollster 
John Zogby trusted the data sufficiently to call the race for Kerry. In the end, network managers 
had to scramble for coverage; editors and journalists had to rewrite headlines and lead stories.  
 
It is alternatively possible that the data were already partially calibrated to the count by 12:20 
a.m., but given the news report of the computer glitch preventing NEP updates and an abrupt 
change shortly after 12:20 a.m.,14 that seems unlikely. If, in fact, the data already had been 
partially calibrated, however, it would mean that the uncorrected exit poll numbers favored Kerry 
to an even greater extent. 
 
In summary, I’d rather have NEP data; lacking that (and unless NEP has a change of heart, no 
one is going to see those until well into 200515), these CNN data look good, and can be used to 
generate some highly suggestive findings. 
 
                                                 
13  Using unweighted data, Democrats would almost always outpoll Republicans. Pollsters oversample minorities so 
that they have a sufficient sample size of important demographic groups – but then they negatively weight 
respondents in these groups to adjust for their actual percentage of the electorate.  
14  An Ohio screen shot taken at 1:41 a.m. shows 2,020 respondents with the following percentages: 
 Male (47%): Bush 52% Kerry 47%  
 Female (53%): Bush 50% Kerry 50%  
15  When the data are finally released, they may also be unusable for count verification purposes, because this would 
require original weighting assumptions rather than those that assume the count correct. First, we would need to 
know whether precincts were originally chosen randomly or to ensure sufficient subsamples of important 
demographic groups, i.e., minority precincts. Second, we would need to know the weighting of individual 
respondents to adjust for exit poll observations, e.g., African-Americans disproportionately participated in the poll, 
rather than weighting to make the numbers match up with the tallies, e.g., African Americans must have been 
oversampled because otherwise Kerry’s vote total would have been higher. 
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On (Uncorrected) Exit Polls 
Conducting an exit poll presents many challenges, several of which potentially might have 
caused errors that would have resulted in election day discrepancies. I’ll discuss these at length in 
a subsequent report along with a discussion of potential count errors, but in general, we have 
reason to believe that exit polls, by which I mean uncorrected exit polls, are accurate survey 
instruments. Exit polls are surveys taken of representative respondents from the overall voting 
population. Both the logic behind them and experience suggest that these surveys should be able 
to predict overall results within statistical limits. It is relatively easy to get a representative 
sample, and there is no problem figuring out who is actually going to vote or how they will vote.  
 
In Germany, as soon as the polls close, polling agencies release prognoses that have proven 
highly reliable. In the three most recent national elections there, poll percentages diverged from 
official counts by an average of only 0.26% (Table 1.2). They have been almost as accurate for 
the German vote in the European Parliament Elections (Table 1.3), averaging 0.44% differential 
from tallied results over the past three elections. 
 
Table 1.216: Exit Poll Predictions vs. Official Counts in German National Elections 
 
Parties 2002 predicted 
2002 
tallied 
2002 
diff 
1998 
predicted
1998 
tallied 
1998 
diff 
1994 
predicted 
1994 
tallied 
1994 
diff 
average
dif 
 SPD 38.0% 38.5% 0.5% 41.0% 40.9% 0.1% 36.5% 36.4% 0.1%   
 CDU/CSU 38.0% 38.5% 0.5% 35.0% 35.2% 0.2% 42.0% 41.4% 0.6%   
 Green 9.0% 8.6% 0.4% 6.5% 6.7% 0.2% 7.0% 7.3% 0.3%   
 FDP 7.5% 7.4% 0.1% 6.5% 6.2% 0.3% 7.0% 6.9% 0.1%   
 PDS 4.0% 4.0% 0.0% 5.0% 5.1% 0.1% 4.0% 4.4% 0.4%   
 Rest 9.0% 8.6%  6.0% 5.9%  3.5% 3.6%    
 Average differential 0.30%     0.18%     0.30% 0.26%
 
 
                                                 
16  Source: Election data: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/  (English: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/wahlen/e/index_e.htm)  
 Prognoses are those of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, which has been conducting exit polls for ZDF, one of the 
two main German television stations. Other television stations employ other exit polling firms, two of which are 
'infratest-dimap' and 'Forsa'. These predictions are, likewise, with rare exception within 1% of the final result (and 
also of each other.) When one polling company was off by 1.5% for one of the major parties in a recent election, 
this 'large' difference was a big surprise for the public as well as for the researchers/pollsters.  
 In sharp contrast to the opacity of NEP practices, the German exit pollsters fully disclose on their websites 
not only the prognosis made as the polls close, but that of every subsequent iteration of the data at intervals 
ranging from about 20 minutes to an hour. Like NEP, they also correct the data based on actual counts from polled 
precincts, but their processes are perfectly transparent, and the original uncorrected numbers remain available for 
anyone to see at any time. Their complete data sets can be accessed through the Central Archive for Empirical 
Social Studies of the University of Cologne.  
 Thanks to Dr. Andreas M. Wuest, Dr. Michael Morrissey, Kurt Gloos, and Lars Vinx for their help in compiling 
these data. 
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Table 1.3: Exit Poll Predictions vs. Counts in European Parliament Elections (German part) 
 
Parties 2004 predicted 
2004 
tallied 
2004 
diff 
1999 
predicted
1999 
tallied 
1999 
diff 
1994 
predicted 
1998 
tallied 
1998 
diff 
average
dif 
 SPD 22.0% 21.5% 0.5% 31.0% 30.7% 0.3% 33.0% 32.2% 0.8%   
 CDU/CSU 45.5% 44.5% 1.0% 48.0% 48.7% 0.7% 40.5% 38.8% 1.7%   
 Green 11.5% 11.9% 0.4% 7.0% 6.4% 0.6% 10.0% 10.1% 0.1%   
 FDP 6.0% 6.1% 0.1% 3.0% 3.0% 0.0% 4.0% 4.1% 0.1%   
 PDS 6.0% 6.1% 0.1% 6.0% 5.8% 0.2% 4.5% 4.7% 0.2%   
 REP       3.5% 3.9% 0.4%  
 Rest 9.0% 9.8%  5.0% 5.4%  4.5% 6.2%    
 Average differential   0.42%     0.36%     0.55% 0.44%
 
To make the numbers more comparable to the US presidential election, I have grouped the 
parties into their coalitions in Table 1.4.17 The results are very accurate, in all cases predict 
correctly the winner, and show no systematic skew.  
 
Table 1.4: Exit Poll Predictions vs. Counts for Coalitions in German National Elections 
 
Coalition 
Election 
SPD/ 
Green 
predicted 
CDU/CSU
FDP 
predicted
Predicted 
differential
SPD/Gree
n tallied 
CU/FDP 
tallied 
Tallied 
differential 
Tallied vs. 
predicted 
2004 European Parliament 33.5% 51.5% CF 18.0 33.4% 50.6% CF 17.2 SG 0.8 
2002 National election 47.0% 45.5% SG 1.5 47.1% 45.9% SG 1.2 CF 0.3 
1999 European Parliament 38.0% 51.0% CF 13.0 37.1% 51.7% CF 14.6 CF 1.6 
1998 National election 47.5% 41.5% SG 6.0 47.6% 41.4% SG 6.2 SG 0.2 
1994 European Parliament 43.0% 44.5% CF 1.5 42.3% 42.9% CF 0.6 SG 0.9 
1994 National election 43.5% 49.0% CF 5.5 43.7% 48.3% CF 4.6 SG 0.9 
 
In the US, exit polls have also been quite precise. Students at BYU have been conducting 
Utah exit polls since 1982.18 They write: 
 
[…] results are very precise; In the 2003 Salt Lake [City] mayoral race, the KBYU/Utah Colleges 
Exit Poll predicted 53.8 percent of the vote for Rocky Anderson and 46.2 percent for Frank 
Pignanelli. In the actual vote, Anderson carried 54 percent of the vote to Pignanelli’s 46 percent. 
 
True to their word, predictions in this year’s contests were quite accurate. In the Utah presidential 
vote, for example, they predicted Bush 70.8%, Kerry 26.5%. The actual was Bush 71.1%, Kerry 
26.4%. Consistently accurate exit poll predictions from student volunteers, including in this 
presidential election, suggest we should expect accuracy, within statistical limits, from the 
                                                 
17  The FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (liberals) is aligned with the Christian Democratic Party, and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) is aligned with the Greens. PDS (socialists) and Republikaner (extreme right) are not in 
any coalition. 
18  Information available at http://exitpoll.byu.edu/2004results.asp. As far as I have been able to determine, this was 
the only other exit poll conducted on the 2004 presidential election, aside from an LA Times poll, for which I could 
not determine whether or not the data were corrected. 
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world’s most professional exit polling enterprise. 
 
Not only can exit polls accurately predict actual voting, they have been widely used to verify 
elections. When Mexico sought legitimacy as a modernizing democracy in 1994, Carlos Salinas 
instituted reforms designed to ensure fair elections, and central among these were exit polls.19 
Exit pollsters were hired again for the subsequent presidential election in 2000,20 and not 
coincidentally, it was the first loss for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in its 72-year 
history. 
 
In Russia, and throughout the former Soviet block, exit polls have been used to verify 
elections. Last fall, international foundations sponsored an exit poll in the former Soviet Republic 
of Georgia during a parliamentary election. Just as happened recently in the Ukraine, exit polls 
projected a victory for the main opposition party, and when the sitting government announced 
that its own slate of candidates had won, supporters of the opposition stormed the Parliament and 
the sitting President resigned under pressure from the United States.21 
 
 
Statistical Analysis of the Three Critical Battleground States:  
Ruling out Chance or Random Error 
 
Three Critical Battleground States 
Conventional wisdom going into the election was that three critical states – Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Florida – would likely determine the winner of the presidential election. 
Typical analyst comments included:  
 
Since Election 2000, Republicans and Democrats have banked their aspirations on an electoral 
trinity: Florida, Pennsylvania and Ohio. As the Big Three goes, so goes the nation.  
- David Paul Kuhn, CBS News: “High-Stakes Battle for the Big 3” Oct. 26, 2004 
 
Conventional wisdom for months, including RCP's, had been that whoever won two of the "big 
three" Ohio, Pennsylvania and Florida would almost certainly become President.  
- Real Clear Politics: posting 10/28/04 
                                                 
19  Paul B. Carroll and Dianne Solis, “Zedillo's apparently clean win at polls diminishes threat of Mexican unrest,” The 
Wall Street Journal, August 23, 1994  
20  Rebeca Rodriguez, “U.S. political consultants signed to conduct exit poll in Mexico,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 
June 16, 2000  
21  Georgia President Eduard A. Shevardnadze resigned under pressure from both the US and Russia. (Martin 
Plissner, “Exit Polls to Protect the Vote,” New York Times, October 17, 2004) 
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The accepted wisdom is that whoever wins two out of the three states of Ohio, Pennsylvania and 
Florida will win the election.  
- Rob Watson, BBC News: October 28, 2004 
 
The numbers and logic were straightforward. Of the other battleground states: Michigan and 
Minnesota leaned Democratic; Colorado and Nevada leaned Republican. Iowa, New Hampshire 
and New Mexico don’t have many electoral votes. Wisconsin has a long tradition as a liberal 
state, and only 10 electoral votes compared to 20, 21, and 29 for the big three.  
 
Campaign activities were also consistent with this logic. Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida were 
the three states the candidates visited most, and in which they spent the most money.22  
 
Conventional wisdom proved correct. Bush won two of the three and ascended to electoral 
victory as a result. In each of these states, however, exit polls deviated significantly from 
recorded tallies (Table 1.5).  
 
Table 1.5: Predicted vs. tallied percentages in the three critical battleground states 
 
 Sample 
size 
Bush 
predicted 
Kerry 
predicted
Predicted 
differential
Bush 
tallied 
Kerry 
tallied 
Tallied 
differential 
Tallied vs. 
predicted 
Florida 2846 49.8% 49.7% Bush 0.123 52.1% 47.1% Bush 5.0 Bush 4.9 
Ohio 1963 47.9% 52.1% Kerry 4.2 51.0% 48.5% Bush 2.5 Bush 6.7 
Pennsylvania 1930 45.4% 54.1% Kerry 8.7 48.6% 50.8% Kerry 2.2 Bush 6.5 
 
A Statistical Anomaly? 
A basic question to ask on looking at such a discrepancy is whether it is just a statistical 
anomaly. It can happen, for example, that a fair coin tossed ten times will land heads each time, 
but it doesn’t happen often (1 out of 1,024 times). If we witness this, we will at least suspect that 
the coin might be adulterated, especially if the stakes are high and we are not permitted to inspect 
the coin carefully.  
 
Statistical significance, which means that the discrepancy is such that it is unlikely to occur by 
chance, depends on four factors – the size of the discrepancy, the size of the sample size, its 
characteristics, and the level of significance (just how unlikely does it have to be?) Table 1.5 
                                                 
22  See stories cited above 
23  Earlier exit polls, including one released by Slate at 7:28 EST, 28 minutes after the Florida polls closed showed 
Kerry leading 51% to 49% (Appendix B) 
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provides sample size and discrepancy. For statistical purposes, these samples are quite large. Two 
thousand or so respondents is roughly the size of most national polls.  
 
Without access to the data and methodology, we cannot model the sample characteristics 
precisely. But we do know the general procedures by which exit polls are conducted. Appendix A 
provides the 2000 presidential election exit poll methodology and a bibliography of articles on the 
process from that and other elections. On this basis we can make a reasonable approximation.  
 
A random sample of a population can be modeled as a normal distribution curve. Exit polls, 
however, are not random samples. To avoid prohibitive expense, exit poll samples are clustered, 
which means that precincts, rather than individuals, are randomly selected. This increases 
variance and thus the margin of error because of the possibility that precinct voters share similar 
characteristics which distinguish them from the rest of the state in ways that past voting behavior 
would not predict. An analysis of the 1996 exit polls estimated that the cluster sample design adds 
“a 30 percent increase in the sampling error computed under the assumption of simple random 
sampling” (Merkle and Edelman, 2000, p. 72). That study is particularly apt because the 1996 
state exit polls involved roughly the same number of precincts (1,468) as this year’s polls 
(1,480).24 Pollsters also have techniques to decrease variance, most notably stratification, which 
helps ensure that the sample is representative of the overall population.25 In the analysis below, 
however, I conservatively assume no counterbalancing effects. 
 
                                                 
24  From the NEP Information page: http://www.exit-poll.net/faq.html#a7 
25  Stratification involves identifying key characteristics that predict voting behavior (race, sex, age, income, ethnicity, 
religion, party affiliation, etc…) and then seeking out subjects with specific demographic characteristics and/or 
weighting groups depending on their representation in the sample compared with that of the overall voting 
population. By getting samples in which minorities are over-represented (but subsequently negatively weighted), 
pollsters can ensure adequate sample sizes of each of these representative subgroups. Knowing exactly how 
much to weight over- or under-represented population depends on an accurate knowledge of overall 
demographics of the electorate. Historical data, census data, and registration roles, can be used to complement 
sampling site counts to try to weight the sample accurately.  
An early draft of this paper based on an assumption that the effects of stratification could balance the effects 
of clustering, generated headline-grabbing probability of 250,000,000-to-one odds. In this analysis, I assume no 
counterbalancing effects at all due to stratification. Although, in principle, pollsters can ensure a more 
representative sample than chance alone would dictate, they face challenges in knowing exactly what weight to 
assign a group. The only measure of the demographics of actual voters on election day is the exit poll itself.  
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Figure 1.2 depicts the resulting distribution curve for samples of 1,963 randomly selected 
respondents from approximately 40 randomly selected precincts in Ohio, a state in which 48.5% 
of the vote went for Kerry. The thin blue density curve is that of a simple random sample; the 
wider purple curve is of a clustered sample with no stratification. The horizontal double arrow 
below the curve indicates the poll’s statistical margin of error, the corresponding 95% confidence 
interval.26 If one hundred unbiased samples were drawn from this population, we would expect 
 
Figure 1.2. Normal distribution curve for sample predictions based on Kerry’s tally in Ohio 
 
If you were to conduct this poll 20 times, 19 times you should get a result between 45.6% and 51.4%. The 
likelihood of the NEP poll prediction exceeding the actual vote by as much as 3.6% is less than 1 in 100. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  To determine the margin of error, calculate the standard error of a random sample using the formula  
where p = Kerry percentage of the vote and N is the sample size. (.0113). To adjust for the fact that this is a 
clustered sample, add 30% (.01466 or 1.47%). Sixty-eight percent of the time, a prediction from a sample this size 
would be within one standard error. Ninety-five percent of the time, it will be within 1.96 standard errors (2.87% in 
this case).  
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that in 95 (on average), Kerry would poll between 45.6% and 51.4%. And because half of the 1-
in-20 cases that fall outside the interval would be low rather than high, 97.5% of the time we 
would expect Kerry to poll no more than 51.4%. It turns out that the likelihood that Kerry would 
poll 52.1% from a population in which he receives only 48.5% of the vote is less than one-in-one-
hundred (.0073). 
Conducting the same analysis for Florida, we find that Kerry’s poll prediction of 49.7% of the 
vote is likewise outside the 95% confidence interval. Given a population in which he receives 
only 47.1% of the vote, the chances that he would poll 49.7% out of 2,846 respondents in an exit 
poll with no systematic error is less than two-in-one-hundred (.0164). In the third critical 
battleground state, Pennsylvania, Kerry’s poll numbers are outside the 95% confidence interval as 
well. Although he did carry the state, the likelihood that an exit poll would predict 54.1%, given 
50.8% support of the electorate is just slightly more than one-in-one-hundred (.0126).   
 
Assuming independent state polls with no systematic bias, the odds against any two of these 
statistical anomalies occurring together are more than 5,000:1 (five times more improbable than 
ten straight heads from a fair coin). The odds against all three occurring together are 662,000-to-
one. As much as we can say in social science that something is impossible, it is impossible that 
the discrepancies between predicted and actual vote counts in the three critical battleground states 
of the 2004 election could have been due to chance or random error.  
 
Media Reports and Official Explanations 
Media coverage of this exit poll discrepancy was strikingly limited in the days following the 
election. I could find few references among national newspapers or broadcasters that constitute 
NEP and virtually no analysis. The New York Times wrote that they obtained a report issued by 
pollsters debunking the possibility that the exit polls are right and the vote count is wrong27, but 
                                                 
27  Jim Rutenberg, “Report Says Problems Led to Skewed Surveying Data,” New York Times, November 5, 2004. The 
Times also ran a series in which Richard J. Meislin, Times editor of news surveys and election analysis, answered 
questions on exit polls and election results. In that piece, he deflected many questions such as I have raised here 
with the equally uninformative announcement that the people,  
“who did them acknowledged yesterday that there had been more problems than were initially 
revealed to their news media customers. See Jim Rutenberg's excellent article today.” 
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the Times does not explain beyond that declaration how the possibility was “debunked.” In fact, 
no evidence whatsoever is presented of skewed survey data or any problem at all with the polls 
except that “uncorrected” data were released to the public. Slate, in contrast, reported that 
Mitofsky and Lenski insisted that the polls were perfectly fine.28 Mitofsky himself only says, “We 
are still investigating the source of the exit poll problem.”29 
 
The Washington Post reported that samples may have included too many women, too few 
Westerners, not enough Republicans, etc ….30 One of the few people close to NEP to offer an 
explanation early on was Martin Plissner, former executive political director of CBS News (and 
self-described close friend of the pollsters), who identifies three problems widely used to dismiss 
the results: 
 
The pollsters who work outside the polling stations often have problems with officials who want to 
limit access to voters. Unless the interviews have sampled the entire day's voters, the results can 
be demographically and hence politically skewed. Finally, it is of course a poll, not a set of actual 
recorded votes like those in the precinct samples collected after the polls close.31 
 
Analysis of First Week Polling Error Explanations  
None of these initial explanations is plausible: 
 
It’s Just a Poll (and polls can be wrong). Well, it’s true (of course) that it’s just a poll, but, as I 
have documented, the evidence and logic on exit polls suggest that we should expect them to be 
are accurate within statistical limits. In the absence of systematic skew or count error, they could 
not have been as far off as they were.  
 
Time-of-Day Bias. End of day numbers favored Kerry (not only early results). This report is 
based on end-of-day data, which happened to still be available at midnight (see page 4).  
 
Pollster Access to Voters. Mitofsky and Lenski have been doing exit polls for decades. There is 
little reason to suspect that they could not manage relations with local election officials or train 
                                                 
28  Martin Plissner “In Defense of Exit Polls: You just don't know how to use them,” Slate, November 4, 2004; Jack 
Shafer, “The official excuses for the bad exit poll numbers don't cut it,” Slate, November 5, 2004 
29  Warren Mitofsky, personal communication, November 10, 2004 
30  Richard Morin, “New Woes Surface in Use of Estimates,” Washington Post, November 4, 2004  
31  Martin Plissner “In Defense of Exit Polls: You just don't know how to use them,” Slate, November 4, 2004 
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their workers to do so. Moreover, even if pollsters did experience difficulties accessing voters, the 
worst that could happen would be increased general error. No suggestion has been offered for 
how access issues could might skew results so dramatically towards Kerry. 
 
Gender Bias. Gender bias would seem an extremely unlikely mistake because exit pollsters can 
visually count who shows up to vote. This is one of the great advantages of the exit poll. The 
pollsters are instructed to note the demographic characteristics of those who refuse to participate 
as well as those who do. They might not always identify age or even race correctly, but they 
should nearly always be able to identify gender. 
 
If males or females disproportionately participate, it doesn’t matter. If the sample were 90% 
female, female preferences would still only be weighted for their share of the electorate; CNN 
and others released data as in Figure 1.1 showing male and female preferences separately and 
their appropriate weight (their percentage of the overall electorate).  
 
Under-representation of Republican constituencies. Random imbalances are part of normal 
sampling error and result in the poll precision and confidence intervals that I have reported. 
Under such conditions, Republicans, Westerners, etc., are equally (un)likely to be over- or under-
represented. Imprecise representation is incorporated within the margin of error. That’s why we 
have the concept of probability densities, margin of error, etc…. If you could choose a perfectly 
representative sample, you could predict outcomes precisely. In principle, the samples should be 
better than random; techniques to ensure sample representativeness can render surveys more 
accurate than a purely random sample, thus making the observed discrepancies even more 
unlikely than my analysis indicates.  
 
Bush voter unwillingness to participate and other “explanations” 
Most recently, Senior Gallup Poll Editor David W. Moore, has quoted Mitofsky and Lenski as 
stating, 
 
Kerry voters apparently were much more willing to participate in the exit poll than were Bush 
voters. The interviewers at each of the sample voting locations are instructed to choose voters as 
they exit from the voting booth -- every third, or fifth, or eighth voter -- some sequence of this sort 
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that is determined ahead of time. Many voters simply refuse to participate in the poll. If the 
refusers are disproportionately for one candidate or another, then the poll will be biased….32 
 
The first problem with this explanation is that the pollsters should make adjustments for 
voters who were missed or refused to be interviewed, based on their observed age, race and sex 
(see Appendix A). But, OK, if Bush voters of all stripes disproportionately refuse to participate, 
that could explain exit poll error. The question is whether we have evidence to support this. 
 
It is conceivable that Kerry voters were much more willing to participate in the exit poll than 
were Bush voters, but although we can imagine why some Bush voters might not want to 
participate, we can similarly imagine why some Kerry voters might not want to participate either. 
 
The problem with this “explanation” or even one that would have considerably more face 
validity (which means that it makes sense on the face of it), such as the possibility that 
absentee/early voters disproportionately favored Bush33, is that it is not an explanation, but rather 
a hypothesis. It’s apparent that “Kerry voters were much more willing to participate in the exit 
poll than Bush voters” only given several questionable assumptions. An explanation would 
require independent evidence.34  
 
The Role of the Exit Poll 
The pollsters have said repeatedly that the purpose of their poll was not to verify the integrity 
of the election; they were hired by the AP-Network consortium to provide supporting data for 
election coverage. In the 2004 US presidential election, however, concerns about this exit poll-
count discrepancy are compounded by concerns about voting technologies, both new (especially 
electronic voting machines without paper trails) and old (punch card ballots still widely in use). 
Allegations about miscount and worse have been lighting up the Internet. In at least two cases, 
vote count errors have been acknowledged and corrected.35 Additional sources of concern include 
                                                 
32  David W. Moore, Senior Gallup Poll Editor, “Conspiracies Galore,” Gallup News Service, November 9, 2004 
33  To the best of my knowledge, the pollsters have not offered absentee/early voters as an explanation by anyone 
from NEP or close to the pollsters, presumably because they were able to predict any disproportionate support 
based on telephone interviews and patterns from previous elections. 
34  I could imagine various types of supportive evidence. One possibility would be verifying sampled results versus 
actual voting patterns in random sample precincts where counts are unimpeachable. 
35  “Glitch gave Bush extra votes in Ohio,” CNN, November 5, 2004 
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mistabulation through “spoilage,” (as we saw in Florida in 2000, large numbers of votes are 
commonly lost due to imperfections in the voting process), overuse of provisional ballots, and 
limited access by observers to some vote tallies.36 Verifying the integrity of elections is important 
not only in Mexico, Venezuela, and former Soviet Union Republics. Whatever the original 
purpose of this particular exit poll, it could be used to help verify the integrity of this election if 
its data and methodology could be reviewed by independent investigators.  
 
 
Summary and Implications 
In this report, I have: (1) documented that, in general, exit poll data are sound, (2) demon-
strated that it is exceedingly unlikely that the deviations between exit poll predictions and vote 
tallies in the three critical battleground states could have occurred strictly by chance or random 
error, and (3) explained why explanations for the discrepancy thus far provided are inadequate. 
 
The unexplained discrepancy leaves us with two broad categories of hypotheses: the exit poll 
data are wrong (or misleading) in ways that have yet to be documented, or the count is off. The 
most important investigations concern verification of the tallies and allegations of fraud on one 
hand; and the exit poll data and methodology on the other. Particularly useful statistical analyses 
would compare the “shift” in states, counties and precincts where safeguards are strong vs. those 
where they are suspect, but such analyses require NEP’s raw data.  
 
Given that neither the pollsters nor their media clients have provided solid explanations to the 
public, suspicion of mistabulation or even fraud is running rampant and unchecked. The fact that 
so many people suspect misplay undermines not only the legitimacy of the presidency, but faith 
in the foundations of the democracy. 
 
Systematic fraud or mistabulation is as yet an unfounded conclusion, but the election’s 
unexplained exit poll discrepancies make it an unavoidable hypothesis, one that is the 
responsibility of the media, academia, polling agencies, and the public to investigate.  
╝ 
 
                                                 
36  Erica Solvig, “Warren's [Warren County, Ohio] vote tally walled off.” Cincinnati Enquirer, November 5, 2004  
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Appendix A: 2000 Voter News Service Exit Poll Methodology37 
 
METHODOLOGY STATEMENT 
 
The VNS exit poll was developed and conducted by Voter News Service. The exit poll results are based 
on interviews with a probability sample of voters exiting polling places on Election Day, 2002.  
 
Sampling 
 
The samples were selected in two stages. First, a probability sample of voting precincts within each state 
was selected that represents the different geographic areas across the state and the vote by party. 
Precincts were selected with a probability proportionate to the number of voters in each precinct. Each 
voter in a state had the same chance to have his or her precinct selected. There is one exception. In some 
states, precincts that have large minority populations were sampled at a higher rate than other precincts. 
The sample weighting (described below) adjusts the representation of these precincts to their correct 
share of the total vote. Second, within each precinct, voters were sampled systematically throughout the 
voting day at a rate that gives all voters in a precinct the same chance of being interviewed. 
The National sample is a subsample of the state sample precincts. The probability of selecting these 
precincts was the same as if the sample had been selected at a uniform rate nationwide, with the 
exception that minority precincts were again selected at a higher rate. 
Weighting 
 
The exit poll results are weighted to reflect the complexity of the sampling design. That is, the weighting 
takes into account the different probabilities of selecting a precinct and of selecting a voter within each 
precinct. For example, states that were selected at a higher rate receive a smaller weight than other 
precincts of the same size. There is also an adjustment for voters who were missed or refused to be 
interviewed, which is based on their observed age, race and sex.  
                                                 
37  Description and data available at the University of Michigan Survey Research Center and the Roper Center at the 
University of Connecticut (http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/03527.xml or 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/usvns2002_2.html) 
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NOTE: THE EXIT POLL RESULTS ARE ONLY MEANINGFUL IF THEY ARE WEIGHTED. 
UNWEIGHTED TABULATIONS MAY BE SERIOUSLY MISLEADING AND SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR 
ANY REASON. 
 
Appendix B:  Slate Election Day Exit Poll Numbers  
 
Updated Late Afternoon Numbers 
Mucho flattering to Kerry; plus Nader makes an appearance.  
By Jack Shafer 
Updated Tuesday, Nov. 2, 2004, at 4:28 PM PT  
 
Pennsylvania  
Kerry  53 
Bush   46 
New Jersey 
Kerry    54 
Bush     44 
Nader     1 
New York 
Kerry   62 
Bush    36 
Nader    2 
New Hampshire 
Kerry   54 
Bush    44 
Nader    1 
 
Florida 
Kerry  51 
Bush   49 
Arkansas  
Kerry   45 
Bush    54 
Nader     1 
Missouri  
Kerry   47 
Bush    52 
 
West Virginia 
Kerry   45 
Bush    54 
Nader    1 
 
Ohio 
Kerry  51 
Bush   49 
Michigan 
Kerry  52 
Bush   46 
Nader   1  
Wisconsin 
Kerry   51 
Bush    48 
Nader    1 
Minnesota 
Kerry   52 
Bush    46 
Nader     2 
 
Iowa 
Kerry  50 
Bush   49 
Colorado  
Kerry   49 
Bush    50 
Nader    1 
Nevada 
Kerry    49 
Bush     48 
Nader     1 
New Mexico 
Kerry   50 
Bush    48 
Nader    1 
 
 
